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Legal Commentary: St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Collins and 
others, ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 673 
 
Sheelagh McGuinness 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This commentary reflects on the actual judgement and the ethical judgments in the 
case of St George’s Health NHS Trust v S. My argument provides a feminist legal 
critique and through a wider socio-legal contextualisation, invites an understanding of 
the systemic harms to women and their reproductive freedom that may be achieved 
through the law, given not just the outcome of S’s case, but also the reasoning within 
and around it.  
My analysis is framed by the concept of ‘gendered harms’ in reproduction and 
pregnancy. I take this framing from Robin West, who suggests that legal systems can 
compound and legitimate harms that are experienced disproportionately or solely by 
women.1 Joanne Conaghan summarises the concept as follows: 
[T]he notion of 'gendered harm' is but one way of recognizing that injury 
has a social as well as an individual dimension: people suffer harm not just 
because they are individuals but also because they are part of a particular 
class, group, race or gender. Moreover, their membership of that particular 
class, group, race or gender can significantly shape the nature and degree of 
the harm they sustain. The problem with law then is its failure to recognize 
                                                        
1 Robin West Caring for Justice (New York University Press, 1997) 
   
that social dimension.2  
It is my argument that we must recognise how law’s manipulation of women and their 
(potential) reproductive choices shapes social norms and expectations.3  
To fully understand how women are subjugated and oppressed in the sphere of 
reproduction, it is crucial to recognise the stark contrast between the respect afforded 
to non-pregnant persons’ medical decision-making and that of pregnant persons. 
Furthermore, it is not just pregnant women who are oppressed, but all women with the 
capacity to become pregnant. In regard to the latter, their agency is contingent on a 
hypothetical state that they may never enter. As Drucilla Cornell tells us: 
The very constitution of selfhood cannot be separated from the protection of 
the future projections of the woman’s self as a whole body. The threat takes 
effect before any woman actually has to face an unwanted pregnancy. Here 
we have an important example of how the symbolization of a woman’s 
“sex” has a constitutive effect on what we have come to think of as 
selfhood. Not only is a woman’s individuality not just given, it is limited in 
its very definition by certain symbolizations of her “sex” in the law.4 
Women with the capacity to become pregnant live in the shadow of this latent state of 
affairs. And, as evidenced by the circumstances of S’s case and the rhetoric in parts of 
the judgments, such women’s agency (legal, moral, and social) is contingent on 
pregnancy not arising. Given this, it is not just unwanted pregnancy that gives rise to 
contingent subjectivity, but all instances of pregnancy within legal cultures that allow 
                                                        
2 Joanne Conaghan ‘Gendered Harms and the Law of Tort: Remedying (Sexual) Harassment’ 
(1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 408 
3 See for example Rebeka Kukla, Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and Mothers’ Bodies (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005) 
4 Drucilla Cornell, The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harrassment 
(Routledge 1995) 52 
   
pregnant women’s decision-making capacity to be treated with suspicion: or as stated 
by Fovargue LJ “place[s] pregnant women in a different position to others with 
capacity”.5  Decisions such as Neal LJ’s are therefore best understood, I will argue, as 
examples of how law legitimates and compounds a particular form of gendered harm.6 
And it is not just the sanction of forcible treatment but the broader legal culture which 
makes forcible treatment possible.  
I will conclude that law is consistently disappointing in the sphere of 
reproductive “control”. Sorcha Uí Chonnachtaigh, in her ethical commentary, details 
the negative reproductive experiences that women continue to have, notwithstanding 
grand statements from the Courts and legislators.7 As Carol Smart warns us: 
Just as medicine is seen as curative rather than iatrogenic, so law is seen as 
extending rights rather than creating wrongs. It is perhaps useful to coin the 
term juridogenic to apply to law as a way of conceptualizing the harm that law 
may generate as a consequence of its operations.8 
It is my contention that a legal culture which attributes subjectivity to the foetus 
prioritises foetal interests through enforcing treatment on pregnant women and causes 
a specific form of gendered harm on women like S even where it appears to vindicate 
their rights.  
 
2. The Importance of Autonomy in Medical Law 
                                                        
5 Fovargue, LJ , this volume, s.17 
6 Neal, LJ , this volume 
7 Sorcha Ui Chonnachtaigh, this volume drawing from Birthrights, Dignity in Childbirth: The 
dignity survey 2013: Women's and midwives' experiences of dignity in UK maternity 
care (Birthrights, 2013) 
8 Carol Smart Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge, 1989) 12 
   
Respect for patient autonomy is a foundational principle in English medical law.9 
However, early judicial defences of the primacy of respect for patient autonomy 
provide a potential exception if the interests of a foetus were at stake. Consider Lord 
Donaldson MR’s famous dicta in Re T: 
An adult patient who … suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute 
right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment... The only possible 
qualification is a case in which the choice may lead to the death of a viable 
foetus... This right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might 
regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the 
choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.10 
This reasoning provides a key legal cornerstone for Neal LJ’s decision and 
reflects a legal culture that is prepared to attribute subjectivity to the foetus.11 West 
highlights the importance of examining legal culture when considering the impact of 
gendered harms. She argues that to focus exclusively on “positivistic or 
instrumentalist” forms of sanction misses how law influences how we behave and 
how we perceive ourselves and as such shapes our behaviour.12 Within the sphere of 
reproductive control, I would suggest, judicial expressions of expectations of pregnant 
women lead to the reinforcement of some of the most archetypal examples of 
patriarchal oppression; legal judgments themselves reinforce societal expectations of 
limits that should be placed on (potentially) pregnant women, as a category that can 
and should be contrasted with other patients.13 
                                                        
9 John Coggon ‘Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable 
Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism?’ (2007) 15 Health Care Analysis 235-255 
10 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] WLR 786 
11 Neal (n6) s.5 
12 West (n1) 151 
13 See Sara Fovargue & Jose Miola ‘Policing pregnancy: implications of the attorney-general's 
reference (no. 3 of 1994)’ (1998) 6 Medical Law Review 265-296. 
   
This distinctive treatment is marked, and cannot be overstated. Forcible 
treatment of pregnant women constitutes a sharp departure from the principle of 
respect for autonomy; a principle whose importance extends generally in medical law 
not just to contemporaneous decision-making, but also to considering the previous 
wishes, feelings, and values patients who come to lose capacity.14 Against this general 
absolutist respect for patient autonomy in medical law, and the high reverence given 
to individuals’ previously expressed values and wishes once they lose capacity, or 
even after they die, the preparedness even to consider forcing treatment on pregnant 
women presents a deviance that demands scrutiny. 
We come to this position as a consequence of attributing of subjectivity to the 
foetus. This process of attribution robs the pregnant woman of her own subjectivity 
and reduces her to the physicality of her role as foetal incubator. Susun Bordo frames 
it thus: 
The essence of the pregnant woman… is her biological, purely mechanical 
role in preserving the life of another. In her case, this is the given value, 
against which her claims to subjectivity must be rigorously evaluated, and 
they will usually be found wanting insofar as they conflict with her life-
support function. In the face of such conflict, her valuations, choices, 
consciousness are expendable.15 
Thus law and medicine often collude in the sphere of reproductive decision-making to 
legitimate a specific form of gendered harm to pregnant women. 
 
3. Gendered Harms  
                                                        
14 Mental Capacity Act 2005, section 4(6). 
15 Susan Bordo Unbearable Weight Feminism: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (University 
of California Press, 1993) 79 
   
 
So what is the gendered harm that women face here? S was articulate and informed 
about her healthcare rights to the extent that she could challenge and assert how she 
would like to be treated. Yet in Judge LJ’s original decision he expresses sympathy 
for the professionals who have to deal with a woman who is failing to live up to 
societal expectations regarding appropriate maternal behaviour: 
Faced with the serious consequent risk to the health of their babies very 
many mothers would be prepared to compromise their beliefs.16  
S is found to be “intransigent” and the Court expresses admiration for the social 
worker who had S sectioned, noting her “courage in reaching any decision at all in 
such difficult circumstances when faced with a life and death situation and an 
unusual, unreasonable mother to be”.17 
S is unusual; she is articulate and vocal and refuses to capitulate in the face of 
professional opposition. Yet the characterisation of her situation emphasises the 
pervasive and systemic way that her voice—like that of other women—is silenced and 
their subjectivity subsumed by concern for foetal interests. In deciding to act in a way 
that contradicts societal constructions and expectations, S is presented as somehow 
deviant and her sense of self not to be trusted.  
West’s analysis, which provides the gendered harm framing that I am employing 
here, focuses on instances of sexual violence and the experience of unwanted 
pregnancy.18 She argues that these are “defining harmful experiences for women”–
and not just the experience of them, but the capacity of potentially experiencing them. 
I would extend her analysis and suggest that pregnancy can, regardless of whether it is 
                                                        
16 St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Collins and others, ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 673, per 
Lord Judge 694 
17 Ibid 694 [emphasis added] 
18 West (n1) Chapter 4 
   
wanted or not, constitute a harm to women. As much was appreciated by Hale LJ in 
Parkinson: 
Not surprisingly, their Lordships did not go into detail about what is entailed in 
the invasion of bodily integrity caused by conception, pregnancy and child birth. 
But it is worthwhile spelling out the more obvious features… From the moment a 
woman conceives, profound physical changes take place in her body and continue 
to take place not only for the duration of the pregnancy but for some time 
thereafter. Those physical changes bring with them a risk to life and health greater 
than in her non-pregnant state. … Along with these … goes a severe curtailment 
of personal autonomy. Literally, one's life is no longer just one's own but also 
some-one else's. ... Continuing the pregnancy brings a host of lesser infringements 
of autonomy related to the physical changes in the body or responsibility towards 
the growing child.19 
This is the situation for all pregnant women and it is their preparedness to 
undertake this role that leads to what Bordo describes as the “biting injustice” of 
cultural suspicion of pregnant women; pregnant women are according to Bordo 
“probably the ‘Best Samaritans’ of our culture”.20 The harm done to women such as S 
through the threat, and perceived social acceptability, of enforced treatment is taken 
further by understanding the experience of pregnancy as a form of intimacy. Magaret 
Olivia Little argues: 
To be pregnant is to be inhabited. It is to be occupied. It is to be in a state of 
physical intimacy of a particularly thorough-going nature. The fetus intrudes 
on the body massively; whatever medical risks one faces or avoids, the brute 
                                                        
19 Parkinson v St James & Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, per Lady 
Justice Hale at 56 
20 Bordo (n16) 83 
   
fact remains that the fetus shifts and alters the very physical boundaries of 
the woman's self.21 
S, in defining the boundaries of the reproductive experience she wanted, was 
setting intimate boundaries. The hallmarks of our social constructions of positive 
pregnancy are altruistic heroism in which the pregnant woman gives herself over to 
the interests of the foetus in the way Hale LJ describes above. The violence of forced 
caesarean sections constitutes an invasion of bodily integrity and intimacy that shares 
features of the gendered harms of both sexual violence and unwanted pregnancy. The 
process of labour and childbirth are physically and emotionally painful; the pain of 
the physical process but also the altering of the maternal bond between the pregnant 
woman and the foetus she has carried within her.22 When this happens in the context 
of coercion it transforms the birthing process into a traumatic and injurious 
experience; it becomes a form of “invasive terror” which denigrates the woman’s 
selfhood objectifying her as a foetal incubator.23 
In S’s case, she maintains her refusal to consent but does not physically resist: 
In fact she had decided that to struggle physically and be overcome would 
be undignified. She therefore lay still offering no resistance when … she 
was sedated. … … Under the pressures of an exhausting and emotionally 
charged situation, and faced with the court order, S ceased to offer any 
resistance. This was not consent but submission.24 
The outcome for S is a situation where a heightened concern for the foetus leads 
to the wiping out of her agency. S is robbed of her subjectivity and her ability to enter 
into an intimate relationship with her now born child is marred by a violent and 
                                                        
21 Margaret Olivia Little ‘Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate’ (1999) 2 Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 301 
22 West (n1) 127 
23 Here I am drawing on both West (n1) and Bordo (n16) 
24 St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S (n17) 684 
   
traumatic invasion of her body. The forcible treatment constitutes an archetypal 
moment of controlling women to fulfil their mechanistic reproductive function. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
S’s case was part of a series of decisions in English medical law that assessed whether 
women were to be assumed incompetent by virtue of their being in labour or indeed 
simply pregnant. Such cases are interesting in their presentation of foetal subjectivity. 
Imposition of treatment on the pregnant woman against her will is justified by 
reference to the interests of a not yet existing being. And this brings us to the crux of 
the matter. Existing legal frameworks are as likely to harm women like S as they are to 
help her, regardless of the actual legal outcome. 
This is underscored by language such as that used by Neal and Judge LJJ. In 
considering their decisions, we find an acceptance of the legal validity of framing a 
maternal/foetal conflict25 In accepting this framing, we do two things. First, we accept 
the existence of the foetus as an independent entity; and second we accept that the 
pregnant woman constitutes a threat to this entity. In the original decision Judge, LJ 
spends approximately six pages considering ‘the status of the foetus’ but only a single 
page considering the importance of autonomy. Furthermore, he emphasises that most 
would have sympathy with the desire to forcibly treat S, notwithstanding that it was 
unlawful; judicially acknowledging such sympathies serves to legitimise what has 
been done to S. 
Foetal-centric thinking also permeates Neal LJ’s judgment. Her judgement 
radically reinterprets the ‘ethic of care’ to justify the abandonment of the pregnant 
                                                        
25 Bordo (n16) 94 
   
woman’s autonomy to protect the life of the foetus. Her approach uses legal reasoning 
to mask how the pregnant woman’s sense of self cannot be disentangled from her 
decision to navigate the boundaries of the intimate relationship that she has with the 
foetus. Neal LJ uses the rhetoric of the “nearly-born” to advocate for the primacy of 
the “foetus whose gestational parent is determined to destroy it”.26 Her judgment 
elevates the foetus’ status to “the life of another” that S should not be allowed, by 
refusal of consent (to a breach of her bodily integrity) to refuse “non-futile 
treatment”.27 Neal LJ is right to hold, at the time of S, that “our legal culture and its 
ethical underpinnings [were] capable of supporting the qualification of the right to 
refuse treatment contemplated by Lord Donaldson in In re T”. However, this is not 
something to be celebrated.  
Therefore, I welcome Fovargue LJ’s approach, which departs from foetal-
centric thinking acknowledging that:  
It is clear that a theme within the decision making processes of the 
professionals was concern for the health of the foetus. This (unspoken) 
agenda permeates the evidence from the professionals…28 
Fovargue LJ displays sympathy with this approach, but cautions against it, 
reminding us that treatment must be in S’s best interests.29 We should be concerned 
with S’s needs.30 We should try and put ourselves in S’s position. Such an approach 
resists a pervasive attitude within forcible treatment cases where increased empathy 
with the foetus is taken to mean that women’s agency can be reduced.31 
                                                        
26 Neal (n6) s.3 
27 Neal (n6) s.7 
28 Fovargue (n5) 15a 
29 Fovargue (n5) 15b 
30 Fovargue (n5) 14 
31 Fovargue (n5) 17 
   
Overall, though, we cannot confine a legal critique of S to the facts or legal 
reasoning in that case alone; law more widely and insidiously causes systemic harm to 
pregnant women. My intention here is not to ignore the value or dignity of foetal life 
but rather to recalibrate an approach to these cases that imagines “that the ‘life’ of the 
fetus is inseparable from the physical and mental well-being of the women of whose 
body it is part.”32 Whilst judicial reasoning could have led to an outcome against or in 
S’s favour, a truly ethical judgment would not perpetuate law’s reproduction of 
gendered harms, and would instead place the woman and respect for her decision-
making at its heart.  
 
 
 
                                                        
32 Cornell (n4) 32 
